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Abstract 
This report presents results of the impact evaluation of the Directive 2009/12/EC - the 
Airport Charges Directive (ACD) - on the level of airport charges. The ACD aimed to 
influence inter alia the balance of bargaining power between airlines and airports in order 
to promote efficient airport operations and enhance the internal aviation market. The 
rules set out by the ACD apply to airports that registered more than 5 million passengers 
per year and to the largest airport in each Member States (MS). This feature allowed the 
evaluation to be designed by comparing charges of airports handling more than 5 million 
passengers to the ones of airports below the 5 million threshold, before and after the 
transposition of the ACD in their respective MS. Empirical results suggest that the ACD 
reduced airport charges by up to 10% for both low-cost and full-service airlines in the 
case of EU short-haul flights. This effect is statistically relevant, albeit with a low degree 
of confidence, after three years following the implementation. In the case of airports 
serving more than 20 million passengers, that were compared to American and Asian 
airports of similar size, the estimates do not reveal any statistically significant effect on 
airport charges associated to the introduction of the ACD. 
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1 Introduction 
 
The Directive 2009/12/EC - the Airport Charges Directive (ACD) - was approved on 11 
March 2009 and transposed into national legislations by Member States (MS) in the 
period 2011-14. 
The directive establishes “a common framework regulating the essential features of 
airport charges and the way they are set” (Directive 2009/12/EC). The airport charges 
are levied to airlines for financing services provided by the airport managing body related 
to take-off, landing, lighting and parking of aircrafts as well as to the processing of 
passengers and freight. 
Airports are essential facilities for airlines because they provide a key input for the 
provision of their services. Some airports might have some degree of market power in 
setting charges because of the limited competition they face from nearby airports or 
other airports in case of transfer traffic (and for certain point-point-traffic) and from 
inter-modal competition (e.g. from high speed rail networks).1 Factors possibly 
contributing to such a market power include the size of the airport, the mix of 
destinations offered (e.g. short-haul versus long-haul), the status of the airport (hub 
versus non-hub), the presence of other airports not in common ownership in the same 
catchment area as well as the existence of inter-modal competition for some key 
destinations. 
In order to mitigate possible market power in some airport markets, certain MS imposed 
some form of economic regulation in past years. However, economic regulation was not 
harmonised among MS. In some MS only the largest airports were subject to formal 
economic regulation (such as rate of return, price-cap or price monitoring). Among MS, 
airports were also characterised by different ownership arrangements and exposed to 
different degree of competition from nearby airports. Moreover, only some MS had 
already in place an independent sectoral supervisory authority before the transposition of 
the ACD. 
While the ACD did not impose formal price economic regulation, it brought about a 
number of rules and principles aimed to create a common regulatory framework among 
MS and to increase the airlines countervailing bargaining power vis-à-vis airports. Of 
these principles, the most important ones are: i) the principle of non-discrimination 
among airlines; ii) the obligation to consult airlines before modifying the levels and the 
structure of charges and consulting the parties before the implementation of major 
investment programmes; iii) a greater transparency in the charges setting process. 
These rules, together with the establishment of an independent supervisory authority, 
were expected to produce positive effects on the airport-airlines market increasing the 
bargaining power of airlines possibly leading to a reduction in airport charges, everything 
else being equal.2  
This report aims to assess whether the introduction of the ACD had an effect on the level 
of airport charges. The study exploits the fact that the ACD applied to airports serving 
more than 5 million passengers. This feature allows comparing the average change in the 
level of charges before and after the introduction of the ACD for airports in the treatment 
group, i.e. airports that registered above 5 million passengers, to the average change in 
the level of charges for airports in the control group. Yet, in order to have a control group 
as comparable as possible to the treatment group, only airports that registered 
passengers between 2 and 5 million were factored in. Finally, since large airports are 
likely to differ from smaller ones in terms of market power, economies of scale and 
                                           
1 However, some authors have stressed that airports might have incentives not to exploit their possible market 
power. See Section 3. 
2 For example, if the ACD has led some airports to invest more in infrastructure or to increase the quality of 
service, this could have put some upwards pressure on the level of airport charges.  
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routes offered, notably with respect to long-haul intercontinental flights, only airports 
that registered less than 20 million passengers were included in the treatment group. 
The study also investigates the impact of the ACD on this group of very large airports. 
Since there is not a natural control group for these airports within EU, Asian and 
American airports with similar number of passengers were considered. 
Overall, findings can be summarised as follows: 
 The ACD seems to have favoured a reduction in the level of charges by about 
10% for airports in the treatment group but only in the case of flights within the 
EU of both the low cost and full-service airlines. This effect, which is weakly 
statistically relevant, materialised on average after three years following the 
adoption of the directive; 
 In the case of the other two scenarios considered in the report, intercontinental 
flights (long-haul) of legacy airlines and regional flights, no statistically significant 
results associated to the introduction of the ACD have been detected;  
 The ACD seems not to have affected charges for the largest airports. This result, 
to some extent, might reflect the fact that the control group of non-EU airports is 
probably too heterogeneous with respect to the EU sample in terms of institutions, 
legislation and economic regulation. 
The remainder of the report is organised as follows. Section 2 briefly discusses the main 
provisions of the ACD and its implementation across MS. Section 3 reviews previous 
literature on the determinants of airport charges. Section 4 describes the data and 
Section 5 discusses the econometric approach. Section 6 presents the results and Section 
7 concludes. 
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2 The Airport Charges Directive  
The Directive 2009/12/EC was adopted on 11 March 2009 and transposed by MS into 
national legislations in the period 2011-14. The bulk of countries transposed in 2011-12. 
Table 1 shows the years of transposition for the 28 Member States, Norway and 
Switzerland. 
The transposition year is taken from the EUR-LEX database. For some MS, several 
national acts can be associated with the transposition of the ACD. For example in Spain 
the first national law was passed in 2011 and the last in 2014. For these cases, the last 
implementation year is considered.  
The transposition year as indicated in this report is solely for the purpose of this report. 
It does not provide any indication on the compliance of the transposition in a given MS 
with the ACD and does not prejudge any analysis by the Commission on the compliance 
of the national transposition with the ACD.3  
The rationale for the adoption the ACD was to create a “a common framework regulating 
the essential features of airport charges and the way they are set” (Directive 
2009/12/EC). This framework takes into account the guidelines of the Council of the 
International Civil Aviation Organization, which include the principles of non-
discrimination, cost-relatedness and the establishment of an independent mechanism for 
the economic regulation of airports. 
The ACD concerned the charging system of airports that register more than 5 million 
passengers per year and of the largest airport in a Member State. 
Moreover, the ACD affected only a fraction of the overall charges that are commonly 
levied by airports within the EU. These are called in-scope charges. In particular, the ACD 
targeted the following charges: 
 runaway & parking charges 
 passenger charges 
 infrastructure charges 
 cargo charges 
 noise charges 
By way of contrast, the ACD did not concern charges related to en route and terminal air 
navigation services, passenger security, ground handling, and passengers with reduced 
mobility.4 
The ACD required that the system of in-scope charges complies with the following 
features: 
1. Non-discrimination. Airports cannot charge different prices for the same service 
and any differences associated to environmental and public interest reasons 
should be clearly motivated. Similarly, differentiated services can have different 
charges. 
2. Consultation. The ACD introduced compulsory consultation between the airport 
operators and the airport users. The ACD required the airport operators to consult 
airport users on any proposed change of the level and structure of charges and to 
motivate such change (article 6). Most importantly, in the case of disagreement, 
airport users can bring the case to an independent supervisory authority which 
can adjudicate on the matter. Consultation is necessary when the airport operator 
plans to finalise new infrastructure projects or when service quality level 
agreements are negotiated between airports and airports. 
                                           
3 See Table 4 in Annex 1 for the transposition year considered in this Report 
4 For a detailed description of the charges not included in the ACD see Steer Davies Gleave (2013). 
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3. Transparency. Airport operators shall provide relevant information that can justify 
the level and structure of the charging system (article 7). Airport operators have 
to provide information on the methodology used to set charges, the overall cost 
structure with regard to the facilities and services, the revenue of the different 
charges and the total costs of the services covered by them, forecasts of the 
situation at the airport as regards charges, traffic growth and proposed 
investments, the actual use of airport infrastructures, etc. 
4. Independent supervisory authority. MS are required to set up an independent 
supervisory authority (if not already in place), which is responsible of the 
application of the ACD in the MS.   
These principles, if correctly applied, might engender an increase in the countervailing 
power of airlines vis-à-vis the airport operator, possibly leading to a reduction of the in-
scope airport charges. This will be discussed thoroughly in Section 3. 
The principle of non-discrimination, coupled with a more transparent establishment of a 
charging system, ensures equal treatment of airport users, independent of their 
individual bargaining power. This principle might lead to all airlines benefiting from lower 
charges negotiated by an airport user with higher degree of bargaining power (these are 
usually the largest airport users of a given airport or a low cost carrier).5 
Implementation of the ACD was not uniform across MS, due to a number of reasons. On 
the one hand, some provisions of the ACD were already in place in some MS before the 
transposition of the ACD, as well documented by Steer Davies Gleave (2013). On the 
other hand, it must be recognized that not all MS fully complied with the requirements of 
the directive: indeed, since the transposition deadline the Commission has launched 
investigations or opened infringement procedures against some MS. These facts entail 
that that the effect of the ACD might be expected different for airports operating in these 
MS. 
An increase in bargaining power of airlines might not necessarily result in a downward 
pressure on the level of charges. It could also lead to an increase in the level of services 
with no change in the level of airport charges. In addition, as the ACD allows investments 
in infrastructure to be financed by charges, if airports invest more in infrastructure, this 
could have put some upwards pressure on the level of airport charges. 
                                           
5 See the literature review in Section 3. 
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3 Previous literature on the determinants of airport charges 
 
Several authors have discussed the complex relationship between the intensity of 
competition among airports, the existence of airline countervailing power, the role played 
by non-aviation revenues, and the level of airport charges.6 Haskel et al. (2013) show 
that airports facing competition for most of its routes from other competitors (not under 
common ownership) that are located in its catchment area, are more likely to set lower 
aeronautical charges. Haskel et al. (2013) also show the importance of the vertical 
interactions between airports and airlines. In their model, stronger competition between 
airlines leads to lower aeronautical charges, because there are fewer rents to be 
extracted by the airport from the airlines.7 
Moreover, some authors (e.g. Starkie, 2002) argue that the complementarity between 
the demand for aeronautical and commercial services might reduce the incentives of 
airports to exploit their market power. By keeping airport charges relatively low, airports 
might attract airlines and passengers, boosting their commercial revenues (D’Alfonso and 
Bracaglia, 2017). This can be particularly important in airports where the share of non-
aeronautical revenue accounts for the majority of airport’s revenue. 
Where airlines have more countervailing bargaining power, airports have limited leeway 
to set high aeronautical charges. Yet, if few airlines operate in a given airport, the buyer 
power of airlines can be quite strong. As a matter of fact, airlines’ threat to relocate can 
be highly credible so as to lead to lower charges.8 
From this point of view, the principle of non-discrimination (which should force airports to 
“transfer” discounts enjoyed by airlines with buyer power to other carriers), the 
increased transparency in both the structure of charges and the formal process of 
consultation favoured by the ACD might result in an increase in airlines’ countervailing 
bargaining power, and therefore lead to lower airport charges.9  
Very few empirical studies analysed the impact of airline countervailing power on 
aeronautical charges. Moreover, the only existing studies report mixed evidence.10 Van 
Dender (2007) and Choo (2014) do not find any statistically significant correlation 
between the levels of airport charges and carriers countervailing power in a sample of 
large US airports. Van Dender (2007) measures bargaining power by using an index of 
airlines concentration of each airport, while Choo (2014) considers the market share of 
the dominant airline. Empirical evidence for EU airports reports different results. In 
particular, by using a cross-section of 100 airports located in the EU and EEA countries 
and observed in 2007, Bel and Fageda (2010) find a negative and robust correlation 
between airlines countervailing power (measured by airport’s Hirschman-Herfindal index 
of concentration based on the number of flights offered by the various airlines) and the 
level of airport charges. Similarly, for a panel of the largest 25 British airports observed 
                                           
6 See, for instance, Oum and Fu (2008) and Starkie (2002). 
7 Bottasso et al. (2017) report some very weak evidence consistent with this prediction. 
8 The countervailing buyer power is likely to be particularly strong in the case of airports dominated by low cost 
carriers (LCCs): indeed, LCCs tend to sink a lower share of their costs into a given airport and therefore their 
threats to relocate towards other nearby airports in response to increases in airport charges are more likely to 
be credible and, therefore, effective as a discipline device. 
9 However, in the model of Haskel et al (2013), the principle of non-discrimination leads to higher airport 
charges. This is because, in their model, the extension of any discount obtained in the bargaining process to 
other airlines might make each airline a less tough negotiator, because some of the benefits of the negotiation 
(i.e. lower charges) spill over to other airlines, and therefore are not internalized by a profit maximizing airline.  
10 For the role played by competition among airports, the evidence is rather scant. While Bel and Fageda (2010) 
and Bottasso et al. (2017) find that competition (proxied by the number of airports located within a radius of 
100 km and by the Herfindal index of concentration in the airport’s catchment area, respectively) exerts a 
negative effect on the level of airport charges, Van Dender (2007) and Bilotkach et al (2012) do not find any 
statistically significant effect. As far as the complementarity between aviation and commercial demand is 
concerned, Choo (2014) reports, for a panel of US airports, a negative correlation between the share of non-
aeronautical revenue and charges. By way of contrast, Bilotkach et al (2012) for a panel of EU airports and 
Bottasso et al. (2017) for the UK case do not find a statistically significant relationship. See, for a brief 
summary of this literature, Bottasso et al (2017).  
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over the period 1996-2008, Bottasso et al. (2017) report a strong association between 
airlines buyer power (measured by the largest carrier’s market share in the airport or in 
the catchment area of the airport) and lower aeronautical charges.  
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4 Estimation approach  
 
This section describes the econometric approach used to estimate the impact of the ACD 
on the level of airport charges. The analysis relies on a differences-in-differences 
research design (diff-in-diff), where a “treatment” group of airports is contrasted to a 
control group of airports, before and after the implementation of the Directive. In 
particular, the analysis compares the average change in the level of charges before and 
after the introduction of the ACD for airports in the treatment group, i.e. airports that 
registered more than 5 million passengers, to the average change in the level of charges 
for airports in the control group, i.e. airport handling less than 5 million passengers.  In 
order to have a control group as comparable as possible to the treatment group, only 
airports that registered passengers in the interval 2 to 5 million were factored in. Since 
large airports are likely to be different from small ones in terms of market power, 
economies of scale and routes offered notably with respect to long-haul intercontinental 
flights, the treatment group is comprised of airports that did not register more than 20 
million passengers.  
The present study estimates the following model: 
 
𝑙𝑛𝐶𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼1𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼2𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼3(𝑇𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡) + 𝑓𝑖 +  𝑓𝑡 +  𝑢𝑖𝑡  (1) 
 
where 𝑙𝑛𝐶𝑖𝑡 is the natural logarithm of the level of airport charges in airport i in year t, 𝑇𝑖𝑡 
represents a binary variable equal to 1 for airports that in year t are above the 5 million 
threshold and for the largest airport in a country (if the 5 million threshold was not 
reached by any airport in that MS) and zero otherwise.11 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡 is a binary variable that is 
equal to 1, for a given country, since the year of transposition of the ACD into national 
legislation and zero otherwise.12  
Finally, 𝑓𝑖 and 𝑓𝑡 are airport and year fixed effects, respectively. 𝑓𝑡 are meant to capture 
unobserved determinants of charges common to all airports, such as EU demand for 
aviation services. Likewise, 𝑓𝑖 controls for any time invariant unobserved factors (e.g. 
existence of price regulation in a given airport, broad scale differences, degree of 
competition in their catchment areas, institutions in the local area where the airport is 
located, levels of corruption, long run efficiency of each airport, presence of competing 
airports in their catchment area) that might have driven airport charges. The inclusion of 
airport fixed effects makes the treatment and control groups more comparable.13 
The coefficient 𝛼3 of the interaction term, 𝑇𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡, represents the diff-in-diff estimate of 
the ACD on airport charges. It captures the average differential level of charges of 
treated airports as compared to control airports, after the transposition of the ACD.  
The ACD provision, such as agreement upon new charges and the establishment of the 
national supervisory authority required time to be implemented and thus there are 
reasons to believe that the effect of the ACD needed time to materialize too.14  
For this reason, an additional model which is able to identify year-by-year effects of the 
ACD is estimated as follows: 
 
                                           
11 Very few airports that were below the 5 million threshold at the beginning of the sample period have 
exceeded it over the period considered in this study, and this has usually occurred before the transposition of 
the ACD in the corresponding country. Results are robust to the exclusion of these airports from the sample. 
12 For instance, Italy transposed in 2012. In equation 1 the variable Post takes on the value of one for Italian 
airports in all years from 2012 onwards.  
13 The airport fixed effects control also for cases where provisions of ACD were already in place in given MS.  
14 Moreover, if a country transposed at the end of a given year T (say, in September), it is difficult for the ACD 
to display its effects in the implementation year.  
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𝑙𝑛𝐶𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼1𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼2𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽𝑗 ∑ (𝑇𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡+𝑗)
3
𝑗=−1 + 𝑓𝑖 +  𝑓𝑡 +  𝑢𝑖𝑡  (2) 
 
where, 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡+𝑗 takes on the value of 1 in year t+j, and 0 otherwise. This specification 
allows the ACD to have a differential effect over time. In particular, it is possible to 
compute the effect on the implementation year (j=0), one year after, two years after and 
after three years onwards (these are the terms within the summation operator in 
equation 1). For instance, the 𝛽0 and 𝛽1 estimate the average effect on airport charges on 
the year of implementation and in the subsequent year. The same reasoning occurs for 
the parameter 𝛽2, which captures the impact on airport charges two years after the 
implementation. Finally, the parameter 𝛽3 accounts for the effects after three years since 
the implementation and can be interpreted as the long-run effect of the ACD on airport 
charges. 
Moreover, model (2) controls for anticipatory effects of the ACD. This is captured by the 
parameter 𝛽−1. Were this coefficient significant, it would imply parties anticipated the 
adoption of the ACD and started to act accordingly, by varying the level of charges 
beforehand. Yet, a significant coefficient might indicate the presence of differential trend 
in airport charges between the group of treated airports and control airports in the period 
before the implementation of the Directive. This would make it difficult to understand 
whether the difference in charges after the adoption of ACD is due to this different time 
trend between the two groups or be the result of the Directive itself.15 
To cope with the possible presence of serial correlation in airports at MS level, the 
models (1)-(2) use robust standard errors clustered at the country level. To take into 
account the different airports size the models are estimated by weighting the observation 
by the number of the passengers.   
 
4.1 The international sample 
In order to extend the analysis to the largest EU airports, namely those with more than 
20 million passengers, it is necessary to have a control group of airports as comparable 
as possible to the treated ones. This implies to use information of Asian and American 
airports that served more than 20 million passengers.  
The present study estimates the following model:  
 
𝑙𝑛𝐶𝑖𝑡 = 𝛾1𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾2𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾3(𝑇𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡) + 𝑓𝑖 +  𝑓𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡   (3) 
 
where 𝑇𝑖𝑡 takes on the value of one for EU airports and 0 for non-EU airports;   𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡 is a 
binary variable which equals one for the period after an EU country transposed the 
Directive and zero for the period before the transposition. 𝑓𝑖   and 𝑓𝑡 are the airport and 
year fixed effects respectively, while 𝑢𝑖𝑡  is the error term. This model has been estimated 
considering only scenario 2, namely the one that includes long-haul intercontinental 
flights. This choice is driven by the fact that this type of flight is likely to be the most 
relevant one for the international comparison.  
A concern associated to this model is that the control group belongs to institutional 
environments which can be very different from the EU one and possibly subject to 
different economic conditions, business cycles and different legislation. Model (3) 
attempts to take this into account by including airport and time fixed effects. However, 
this could not suffice and hence results should be taken with caution.    
                                           
15 A key assumption of the difference-in-differences estimator is that changes in outcome variable for the 
treatment and control groups follow a parallel trend. This assumption is known as the parallel trend 
assumption. A failure of this might either overstate or understate the effect of the policy. 
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5 Data 
Data on airports charges were taken from airportcharges.com provided by RDC aviation. 
The database contains detailed information on different types of charges for worldwide 
airports. Data used for the present analysis refers to airport charges as of the June, 1 of 
each year. 
Airport charges vary accordingly to a number of factors such as size of the aircraft, 
number of passengers, flights schedule, parking time and other flight characteristics 
together with the types of services used at the airport. There is no unique measure to 
use for the analysis. The present study followed Steer Davies Gleave’s report (2017) and 
considered four scenarios, wherein the relevant charges are computed.  The first scenario 
considered the costs for short-haul EU flights of legacy (full service) airlines. The second 
scenario included the costs of intercontinental flights (long-haul) of legacy airlines. The 
third scenario took into account EU flights provided by low-cost carriers. The fourth 
scenario considered the costs of regional flights. Table 2 displays the main characteristics 
of the four scenarios. 
Table 1. Turnaround scenarios for airport charges 
 Scenario 1 
Short-haul  
Full service 
carrier 
Scenario 2 
Long-haul 
Full service 
carrier 
Scenario 3 
Short-haul 
Low cost 
carrier 
Scenario 4 
Regional  
Regional 
carrier 
Aircraft A320 B777-200 B737-800 DHC 8-400 
MTOW 74,00 247,00 79,00 27,00 
Passengers 132 143 170 51 
Transfer 
passenger 
26 77 0 10 
Load factor 81,00 80,00 90,00 65,00 
Capacity 162 179 189 78 
Season Summer Summer Summer Summer 
Arrival Time 07:30 05:00 10:00 07:30 
Parking Time 00:45 03:45 00:25 00:35 
 
 
The study considered data for EU airports that registered more than 2 million passengers 
in at least one year over the period 2008-16.  
As for models (1) and (2), the treatment group comprised of EU airports that handled 5 
to 20 million passengers. The control group is made up of EU airports that registered 2 to 
5 million passengers over the sample period. According to the data, very few airports 
that were below the 5 million threshold in 2008 registered more passengers in the 
subsequent years. This usually occurred before the transposition of the ACD. The final 
sample consists of 79 treated airports and 57 airports in the control group.  Table 5 in 
the Annex lists the airports in the treatment and control groups. 
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The “international” sample included only the largest EU, North American and Asian 
airports, i.e. the ones that registered more than 20 million passengers. These amounted 
to 73 airports of which 24 where EU (i.e. treated). The full list of the airports in the 
“international” sample is presented in Table 6 in the Annex.  
Airport charges include a number of charges levied by airports for the use of their 
infrastructure, as well as taxes and other charges collected on behalf of third-party 
providers or public authorities. The ACD concerned a subset of these charges. Among 
these, the RDC aviation database provides information only on the following in-scope 
charges: runaways’ charges, parking charges, passenger charges, infrastructure charges, 
and noise charges.16 
As for robustness checks, the analysis considered charges that are out of the scope of 
the ACD. These (not-in-scope) charges are the following: en route and terminal air 
navigation charges services, passenger security charges, government charges, aircraft 
security charges, and customer charges.17 
Table 3 shows the mean values and the standard deviations of the deflated charges for 
each turnaround scenario as well as the number of airport passengers. These are 
computed for the overall sample and for the treated and control airports. Descriptive 
statistics are reported for the overall time period and for three specific years: 2008, 
2012, 2016. As it regards the whole sample, there has been an increase in the number of 
passengers and in the level of in-scope charges throughout the period 2008-16. This 
increasing trend is also confirmed in the sub-groups, even though treated airports exhibit 
on average a higher level of in-scope charges than airports in the control group. 
                                           
16 Cargo charges in the dataset had only missing or zero values and, thus, were not considered. 
17 The charges are all expressed in euro and deflated by the Harmonised Index of Consumer Price and the 
Consumer Price Index (CPI) for the EU sample and the international sample, respectively. 
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6 Results 
 
Table 4 presents the main findings for the four turnaround scenarios. Column 1 reports, 
for each scenario, the estimated coefficients for the model (1), while the second column 
provides the estimates of the model (2). Column (3) displays estimates for the model 
(2), while including estimates for anticipatory effects. 
Results for the specification (1) indicate that the introduction of the ACD triggered a 
reduction of the level of charges. Nevertheless, the estimated effects are not statistically 
different from zero for all scenarios.  
As regards the model (2), results suggest that charges were lowered three years, or 
more, after the ACD was transposed. This effect is weakly statistically significant at the 
conventional level for EU flights of legacy carriers and for EU low-cost flights (scenario 1 
and 3, respectively). In particular, in the first scenario the directive is associated to a 
decrease in the airport charges by approximately 10%. Similarly, in the third scenario, 
the ACD led to a negative and significant decline of airport charges of 10.7%. 
Given that the mean value of the in-scope charges for scenario 1 (3) was about 2,600 
(3,300) euro,18 what these estimates simply suggest is that ACD led to a reduction in the 
airport charges of about 260 (330) euros. 
As for scenarios 2 and 4, the coefficients associated to the introduction of the ACD are 
negative, albeit not statistically significant, so that it is not possible to reject the null 
hypothesis that the effect of the ACD was indeed zero for this type of charges. 
The results for scenario 2 however are not surprising, since airports of the control group 
were less likely to be connection nodes for long haul (intercontinental) flights as the 
airports in the treated group. Therefore this set of charges may not be fully 
representative of charges really levied to airport users by those airports. 
Analogously, the not statistically significant results for scenarios 4 are possibly due to the 
fact that airports with more than 5 million passengers are less likely to offer regional 
flights. Figure 1 corroborates this assumption by showing that the share of passengers 
carried in regional-type-aircrafts in the period 2008-15 over total passengers was very 
small and decreased over time.    
To check the possibility that there were anticipatory responses by airports in setting 
charges, columns 3 of all scenarios include the variable 1 year before.  Had this been the 
case, the estimated coefficient of this variable would have been negative and statistically 
significant from zero. Table 4 suggests that anticipatory effects are not relevant for all 
scenarios. 
Airport fixed effects control for any unobserved time-invariant differences between 
treated and control airports, that could possibly drive the effect of the ACD. Yet, the 
airport fixed effects should largely capture airport size differentials. However, different 
airports might have experienced changes in the number of passengers over time. In 
order to control for the possibility that the number of passengers changed differentially 
between the treatment and the control group, an additional model that included the 
polynomial of order 3 of the number of passengers was estimated. Results of such 
exercise, not shown in the present report, are consistent with those of Table 4. 
To check the robustness of results, similar models to those reported in Table 4 have been 
estimated by using not-in-scope charges, which are outside the scope of the ACD by 
definition. Therefore, one should not expect to find any statistically significant effects 
associated to the ACD on this category of charges. The results, not shown here but 
available upon request, are not statistically significant for any scenarios.19 These findings 
                                           
18 This corresponded to the average value of in-scope charges in the case of treated airports in 2016. 
19 Moreover, there is no statistically significant difference between countries that received and that did not 
receive a legal notice on the transposition of the ACD. 
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provide two insights. Firstly, the positive estimated coefficients represent a validation of 
the main results for in-scope charges, because they suggest that the reduction of in-
scope charges observed for treated airports after the transposition of the ACD is not due 
to possible unobserved shocks, unrelated to the ACD, that have determined an overall 
decreasing pattern on all categories of charges (in scope and not in scope) in the case of 
treated airports. Secondly, the positive (but not significant coefficients) might suggest 
that there could have been some degree of rebalancing in the charges mix in treated 
airports.  
What all the results seem to point out is that within the European sample there is 
evidence that the ACD might have had an impact, albeit modest, on in-scope charges. 
These effects are more marked for low-cost carriers and for the EU level flights of full 
service airlines, and it took some years to materialize.  
As far as the international sample is concerned, where the biggest European airports 
have been benchmarked with the biggest North American and Asian ones, the analysis 
mainly focused on scenario 2 (long-haul intercontinental flight), which is likely to be the 
most relevant for this sample. In this case, the introduction of the ACD was associated to 
a higher level of charges in the EU airports with respect to their American and Asian 
peers. However, this result must be interpreted with caution. Indeed, in the specification 
with year-by-year effects a positive and statistically significant anticipatory effect was 
found, which points to a clear evidence that EU and non-EU airports might have been on 
different trends, possibly invalidating the parallel trend assumption20. 
                                           
20 Probably, the violation of the parallel trend assumption is due to the significant heterogeneity characterising 
airports in this sample. Indeed, in order to make the parallel trend assumption more likely to be respected, a 
set of airport linear time trends have been included. In this case, findings indicate that ACD was associated to a 
reduction in airport charges, although noisily estimated. 
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Table 2- Summary statistics (European sample) 
 
  Whole sample Treated airports Non-treated airports 
  Mean 2008 2012 2016 Mean 2008 2012 2016 Mean 2008 2012 2016 
             
In-scope charges-Scenario 1 2376.92 2206.10 2343.42 2532.07 2508.74 2403.09 2472.62 2592.53 2223.09 1974.71 2196.04 2449.72 
s.d. 1186.54 1096.33 1205.99 1176.29 1087.64 981.38 1100.24 1090.80 1276.27 1183.98 1309.51 1288.86 
In-scope charges-Scenario 2 4415.45 4239.57 4371.60 4613.20 4596.73 4594.06 4566.23 4670.00 4203.91 3823.18 4149.61 4535.85 
s.d. 2311.44 2122.64 2142.31 2214.92 1997.74 2126.35 1963.16 1972.70 2616.64 2057.55 2325.72 2523.78 
In-scope charges-Scenario 3 2971.83 2738.90 2928.27 3198.54 3161.46 3014.79 3113.64 3288.56 2750.54 2414.84 2716.85 3075.92 
s.d. 1511.41 1413.93 1537.88 1505.49 1426.12 1334.58 1430.48 1452.25 1577.89 1445.92 1637.60 1579.63 
In-scope charges-Scenario 4 960.73 889.64 957.40 1024.73 1037.40 980.93 1045.00 1072.01 871.26 782.42 857.47 960.33 
s.d. 529.61 462.30 544.87 515.67 528.05 413.47 570.57 497.38 517.69 495.87 499.81 537.23 
Passengers 9384991 9043494 9344267 10500000 14900000 14300000 14900000 15900000 2968512 2838537 2965263 3072031 
s.d. 12100000 11700000 12100000 13300000 14400000 13900000 14500000 15300000 1099365 1053303 1121554 1114799 
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Table 3- Main results of the impact of ACD on the level of airport charges.  
 
 Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 
Scenario 4 
 (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) 
             
𝑇𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡 -0.0425   -0.0728   -0.0458   -0.0382   
 (0.347)   (0.233)   (0.306)   (0.356)   
Implementation  0.0134 0.0148  -0.0290 -0.0275  0.00814 0.0112  -0.0161 -0.0148 
  (0.740) (0.740)  (0.405) (0.487)  (0.837) (0.794)  (0.575) (0.664) 
1 Year after  -0.00138 0.000173  -0.0483 -0.0467  0.0132 0.0165  -0.0110 -0.00965 
  (0.976) (0.997)  (0.410) (0.453)  (0.776) (0.750)  (0.797) (0.841) 
2 Years after  -0.0343 -0.0327  -0.0858 -0.0841  -0.0474 -0.0439  -0.0406 -0.0391 
  (0.454) (0.532)  (0.168) (0.208)  (0.315) (0.413)  (0.411) (0.478) 
3 Years (+) after  -0.100* -0.0983  -0.103 -0.101  -0.107* -0.103  -0.0637 -0.0621 
  (0.0819) (0.128)  (0.203) (0.242)  (0.0724) (0.121)  (0.199) (0.275) 
1 Year before   0.00580   0.00605   0.0122   0.00522 
   (0.843)   (0.839)   (0.679)   (0.855) 
Observations 1,017 1,017 1,017 1,017 1,017 1,017 1,017 1,017 1,017 1,017 1,017 1,017 
             
Implementation + 1 Y after 
+ 2 Y after + 3 Y+ after = 0 
 0.0371 0.0467  0.2691 0.2930  0.0200 0.0287  0.3356 0.3788 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Robust p-values in parentheses, SE (not reported) clustered at country level. All regressions include a set of airport fixed effects, year 
effects and 𝑇𝑖𝑡 and 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡 dummies. 
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Figure 1- Share of regional flights passengers over total passengers in European airports (2008, 
2015) 
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7 Conclusions 
 
This report provided an empirical evaluation of the effect of the Airport Charges Directive 
on the levels of airport charges using a difference-in-differences estimator that allows 
disentangling the causal effect of the ACD from underlying trends and other factors 
affecting the airport industry. 
The analysis was mainly focused on the case of airports between 2 and 20 million 
passengers. Such a restriction allows exploiting one feature of the ACD, namely that it 
applies only to airports with more than five million passengers. The airports in the 2-5 
million passenger category can therefore act as a control group for the largest airports.  
Airports with more than 20 million passengers have been excluded, because they are 
likely to be structurally different along a set of dimensions and therefore not directly 
amenable for a comparison with their smaller counterparts.  
In the report, for each airport and year, four kinds of turnaround scenario have been 
defined, and these are broadly representative of airport charges paid, respectively, by 
low cost airlines for within EU flights, full service airlines for within EU flights, full service 
airlines for long-haul intercontinental flights and regional flights with small aircrafts.  
Results on regressions carried out in the main sample, namely the 2-20 million sample of 
EU airports, show a significant negative effect of the ACD on the level of charges of about 
10 per cent after at least three years following transposition into national legislation. This 
result holds in the case of the within EU flights of both the low-cost and full-service 
airlines. In the case of the other two scenarios, the estimates, though negative, are 
smaller and less precise. 
It must be recognized that intercontinental long-haul flights are probably not very 
common in most of the airports considered in this analysis (and surely for the control 
group below the 5 million threshold). Moreover, the fourth scenario relates to regional 
flights with small aircrafts, which might be not very important in terms of passengers 
moved. 
Hence, all in all, it seems reasonable to conclude that the introduction of the ACD might 
have been associated to a reduction in the level of charges, quantified in about 260-330 
euro per flight after at least three years following implementation.  
Finally, for the largest airports above 20 million passengers, the empirical results do not 
provide clear-cut evidence on the impact of the ACD. Whether this is due to possible 
limitations of the ACD in the case of larger airports or to the strong heterogeneity 
characterizing EU and non-EU airports in terms of institutions, legislation and economic 
regulation, is not clear. 
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8 Annex 1 
 
Table 4: Transposition of the Airport Charges Directive 
Country 
 
Austria 2012 
Belgium 2011 
Bulgaria 2011 
Cyprus21 - 
Czech Republic 2011 
Croatia 2013 
Denmark 2011 
Estonia 2011 
Finland 2011 
France 2012 
Germany 2012 
Greece 2012 
Hungary 2011 
Ireland 2011 
Italy 2012 
Latvia 2011 
Lithuania 2011 
Luxembourg 2012 
Malta 2011 
Netherlands 2011 
Norway 2012 
Poland 2013 
Portugal 2012 
Romania 2011 
Slovenia 2011 
Slovakia 2011 
Spain 2014 
Sweden 2011 
United Kingdom 2011 
Switzerland 2012 
Iceland 2012 
 
  
                                           
21 Transposition year for Cyprus is not reported because the only airport considered (Larnaka airport), although 
covered by the ACD (being the largest airport in the country), had charges fixed for 25 years under the BOT 
(Build-Operate-Transfer) agreement signed in 2006 by the Cypriot Government with a private operator. For this 
reason we have included Larnaka airport into the control group throughout the sample period.  
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Table 5- List of the airports in the treatment and control groups 
Treated group Control group Switchers 
Code 
 
Code 
 
Code 
 
year 
AGP Malaga  ABZ Aberdeen  ACE Lanzarote  2011 
ALC Alicante  BBU Bucharest - Baneasa  BGO Bergen - Flesland  2011 
AMS Amsterdam - Schiphol  BDS Brindisi - Papola Casale  BOD Bordeaux  2015 
ARN Stockholm - Arlanda  BFS Belfast International  CIA Rome - Ciampino  2015 
ATH Athens - Eleftherios  BHD Belfast City  GOT Gothenburg - Landvetter  2013 
BCN Barcelona  BIO Bilbao  HAJ Hanover  2011 
BGY Milan - Orio Al Serio  BLL Billund  HER Heraklion - N. Kazantzakis  2011 
BHX Birmingham International  BMA Stockholm - Bromma  MLH Euro Basel-Mulhouse-Freiburg 2013 
BLQ Bologna - Guglielmo Marconi  BOJ Bourgas  OTP Bucharest – H.C. 2011 
BRS Bristol  BRE Bremen  SKG Thessaloniki International  2014 
BRU Brussels - National  BRI Bari - Palese  VLC Valencia  2015 
BTS Bratislava  BVA Paris - Beauvais-Tille  
   
BUD Budapest - Ferihegy  CAG Cagliari - Elmas  
   
CDG Paris - Charles De Gaulle  CFU Kerkyra - I. Kapodistrias  
   
CGN Cologne Bonn  CHQ Chania International  
   
CPH Copenhagen  CWL Cardiff  
   
CRL Brussels South Charleroi  DTM Dortmund  
   
CTA Catania - Fontanarossa  EIN Eindhoven  
   
DUB Dublin  EMA East Midlands  
   
DUS Dusseldorf  FLR Florence - Peretola  
   
EDI Edinburgh  FNC Madeira  
   
FAO Faro  FUE Fuerteventura  
   
FCO Rome - Fiumicino  GDN Gdansk Lech Walesa  
   
FRA Frankfurt International  GRO Gerona - Costa Brava  
   
GLA Glasgow International  HHN Frankfurt - Hahn  
   
GVA Geneva - Cointrin  KGS Kos  
   
HAM Hamburg  KRK Krakow-Balice  
   
HEL Helsinki-Vantaa  KTW Katowice International  
   
IBZ Ibiza  LBA Leeds/Bradford  
   
KEF Reykjavik - Keflavik  LCA Larnaca  
   
LGW London - Gatwick  LCY London City  
   
LHR London - Heathrow  LEJ Leipzig/Halle  
   
LIN Milan - Linate  MAH Menorca  
   
LIS Lisbon  MMX Malmo - Sturup  
   
LJU Ljubljana Jože Pucnik  NCL Newcastle  
   
LPA Las Palmas -  De Gran Canaria NRN Dusseldorf - Niederrhein  
   
LPL Liverpool John Lennon  NTE Nantes Atlantique  
   
LTN London - Luton  NUE Nuremberg  
   
LUX Luxembourg  NYO Stockholm - Skavsta  
   
LYS Lyon - Saint Exupery  OLB Olbia - Costa Smeralda  
   
MAD Madrid - Barajas  ORK Cork  
   
MAN Manchester International  PFO Paphos International  
   
MLA Malta International  PIK Glasgow Prestwick  
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MRS Marseille  PMO Palermo - Punta Raisi  
   
MUC Munich - Franz Josef Strauss  PSA Pisa - Galileo Galilei  
   
MXP Milan - Malpensa  RHO Rhodes International   
   
NAP Naples  SCQ Santiago De Compostela  
   
NCE Nice - Cote D'Azur  SNN Shannon  
   
OPO Porto  SUF Lamezia Terme  
   
ORY Paris - Orly SVG Stavanger - Sola  
   
OSL Oslo  SVQ Sevilla - San Pablo  
   
PMI Palma Mallorca  TFS Tenerife South  
   
PRG Prague - Ruzyne  TRD Trondheim - Vaernes  
   
RIX Riga  TRN Turin - Caselle  
   
SOF Sofia  TSF Venice - Treviso  
   
STN London - Stansted  VRN Verona  
   
STR Stuttgart  WRO Wroclaw Copernicus  
   
SXF Berlin - Schoenefeld  
     
TFN Tenerife North  
     
TLL Tallinn - Ulemiste  
     
TLS Toulouse - Blagnac  
     
TXL Berlin - Tegel  
     
VCE Venice - Marco Polo  
     
VIE Vienna International  
     
VNO Vilnius International  
     
WAW Warsaw - Frederic Chopin  
     
ZAG Zagreb  
     
ZRH Zurich        
  
         
 
Treated group - airports with more than 5 million passengers (2010); Control group- airports with 
more than 2 million but less than 5 million passengers (2010); Switchers- airports that became 
treated throughout the period analysed. 
 
  
23 
 
Table 6- List of the airports in the treatment and control groups in the international 
sample 
EU airports with more than 20 million passengers Top Asian and North American airports 
Code 
 
Code 
 
AMS Amsterdam - Schiphol  ATL Hartsfield-Jackson Atlanta International  
ARN Stockholm - Arlanda  BKK Bangkok - Suvarnabhumi International  
BCN Barcelona  BOM Mumbai  
BRU Brussels - National  BOS Boston - Logan International  
CDG Paris - Charles De Gaulle  BWI Baltimore/Washington International T. M. 
CPH Copenhagen  CAN Guangzhou - Baiyun  
DUB Dublin  CGK Jakarta - Soekarno-Hatta International  
DUS Dusseldorf  CLT Charlotte - Douglas  
FCO Rome - Fiumicino  CTU Chengdu  
FRA Frankfurt International  DEL Delhi - Indira Gandhi International  
LGW London - Gatwick  DEN Denver International  
LHR London - Heathrow  DFW Dallas/Ft. Worth International  
LIS Lisbon  DTW Detroit - Wayne County  
MAD Madrid - Barajas  DXB Dubai  
MAN Manchester International  EWR New York - Newark Liberty International  
MUC Munich - Franz Josef Strauss  FLL Fort Lauderdale-Hollywood International  
MXP Milan - Malpensa  GRU Sao Paulo - Guarulhos International  
ORY Paris - Orly HKG Hong Kong International  
OSL Oslo  HND Tokyo - Haneda  
PMI Palma Mallorca  IAD Washington - Dulles International  
STN London - Stansted  IAH Houston - George Bush Intercontinental  
TXL Berlin - Tegel  ICN Seoul - Incheon International  
VIE Vienna International  IST Istanbul - Ataturk  
ZRH Zurich  JFK New York - John F. Kennedy International  
  
KMG Kunming  
  
KUL Kuala Lumpur International  
  
LAS Las Vegas - McCarran International  
  
LAX Los Angeles International  
  
LGA New York - La Guardia  
  
MCO Orlando International  
  
MEX Mexico City - Juarez International  
  
MIA Miami International  
  
MNL Manila - Ninoy Aquino International  
  
MSP Minneapolis - St Paul International  
  
NRT Tokyo - Narita  
  
ORD Chicago - O'Hare International  
  
PEK Beijing - Capital  
  
PHL Philadelphia International  
  
PHX Phoenix - Sky Harbor International  
  
PVG Shanghai - Pu Dong  
  
SEA Seattle/Tacoma International  
  
SFO San Francisco International  
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SHA Shanghai - Hongqiao  
  
SIN Singapore - Changi  
  
SLC Salt Lake City International  
  
SYD Sydney - Kingsford Smith  
  
SZX Shenzhen  
  
TPE Taipei - Taiwan Taoyuan International  
  
YYZ Toronto - Pearson International  
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